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APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE KENNETH R. RIGTRUP 
JURISDICTION 
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference the statement of 
jurisdiction set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference the issues presented for 
review as set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference her statement of relief 
sought on appeal as set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference her statement of the case 
as set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference her statement of facts set 
forth in Appellant's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error in granting defendant 
Curtis Industries, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. It was 
contrary to the rule of res ipsa loquitur for Judge Rigtrup to 
grant that motion. It is necessary and appropriate for Ms. Lamb to 
be granted a new trial against both defendants. 
II. 
The cases from other jurisdictions that impose upon operators 
of amusement rides a standard of care tantamount to the common 
carrier standard of care are the better reasoned cases and those 
embodying better public policy. There is no meaningful distinction 
between carriers and operators of amusement rides to justify 
differing standards of care. This Court should adopt the higher 
standard of care and, accordingly, order a new trial against B & B. 
III. 
It was improper and constituted reversible error for the 
District Court to permit B & B's expert to opine that the accident 
occurred due to a defective or "flawed" bolt. 
IV. 
B & B's discussion of Ms. Lamb's damages is inappropriate and 
irrelevant for purposes of this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A SIMULTANEOUS TRIAL AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS 
IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE• 
Ms. Lamb was riding as a paying passenger on B St B's roller 
coaster, with her son, when two of the coaster's cars separated. 
The cars separated for a reason (the bolt broke or became loose 
from its restraining device and fell off). Under the 
circumstances, Ms. Lamb was not in a position to explain what 
happened. 
The accident occurred (1) because Curtis sold a defective bolt 
to B & B and/or (2) because B & B failed to take appropriate care 
to maintain and/or inspect the bolt. In short, the only two 
parties who could have been responsible for this accident were 
Curtis, the manufacturer and seller to B & B of the bolt that was 
used to attach the cars to one another, and B & B, the owner and 
operator of the ride. Ms. Lamb did nothing wrong. B & B conceded 
that point before trial. Because Judge Rigtrup granted Curtis's 
motion for summary judgment, B & B was able to point, and did point 
(over Ms. Lamb's strenuous pre-trial and trial objections), to an 
"empty chair" at trial. 
Contrary to the arguments made in the Curtis Brief, the res 
ipsa loquitur cases cited in Appellant's Brief clearly show that it 
was improper for Judge Rigtrup to grant the Curtis motion for 
summary judgment, the Curtis Brief's urging this Court to adopt a 
minimalist view of the doctrine notwithstanding. Judge Rigtrup's 
ruling was contrary to the purpose and the spirit of the rule of 
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res ipsa loquitur. Regardless of the fact that Ms. Lamb offered no 
"Rule 56(f) affidavit" (Curtis Brief at 12), and regardless of the 
fact that Ms. Lamb's expert was of the view that B & B's negligence 
was the sole cause of the accident, the state of the record before 
Judge Rigtrup at the summary judgment state clearly mandated the 
denial of the Curtis motion. 
If this Court determines to reverse the summary judgment 
against Curtis and permit Ms. Lamb to have her trial against Curtis 
without B & B, the same dilemma will arise. Curtis will then have 
its turn to point to an "empty chair" at whose feet blame can be 
laid. 
B & B argues that the jury has already considered Ms. Lamb's 
theories of negligence against it. However, due to the District 
Court's reversible errors (a) in granting Curtis's motion for 
summary judgment; (b) in ruling that B & B's standard of care was 
simple negligence; and (c) in permitting B & B's Dr. Blotter to 
testify that the most likely explanation for the subject accident 
was a flawed or defective bolt, and due to B & B's taking advantage 
of those rulings, it is appropriate that this case be retried, with 
both B & B and Curtis participating as defendants. 
Contrary to B & B's suggestion (B & B's Brief at 26) , Ms. Lamb 
was in no sense constrained to seek interlocutory review of Judge 
Rigtrup's granting of the Curtis summary judgment motion. This 
Court very seldom grants such review and, Ms. Lamb submits, would 
not likely have granted it in this case. Quite apart from the 
matter of the general ill-advisedness of reviewing cases piecemeal, 
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this Court would likely have determined, if it had considered such 
a putative petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, that 
Ms. Lamb was likely to have prevailed at trial against B & B alone 
(especially if B & B was not allowed to point to the empty chair), 
would not likely have granted leave to file, and would, thus, not 
have reached the merits of the granting of the Curtis motion for 
summary judgment. 
POINT II 
THE STANDARD OF CARE IMPOSED UPON B & B SHOULD BE 
A COMMON CARRIER'S STANDARD OF CARE. 
B & B argues that the District Court did not err in refusing 
to instruct the jury that the appropriate standard of care imposed 
upon B & B is tantamount to the common carrier standard of care. 
In its Brief, B & B cites various old authorities and a few cases 
(including one decided in 1923) for the proposition that ordinary 
care is the appropriate standard of care for operators of amusement 
rides. Ms. Lamb acknowledges that there is a clear split of 
authority on this issue but submits that the cases imposing a 
common carrier standard of care on the operators of amusement rides 
are better reasoned and embody better public policy. 
B & B argues that the distinction between a traditionally 
recognized common carrier and an amusement ride operator justifies 
differing standards of care. The distinction relied on by B & B is 
that a common carrier transports a person from one place to 
another, for purposes of "business or personal necessity" (B & B's 
Brief at 31) whereas an amusement ride operator conveys its 
passengers to a point at or near the point where they originally 
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boarded; that carriage of amusement ride passengers is incidental; 
and that the purpose of an amusement ride is to provide 
entertainment and thrills.1 
The distinction posited by B & B does not make sense. The 
important factor in determining the level of care that should be 
imposed upon a traditional carrier or on an amusement ride operator 
is that passengers surrender themselves, for a fee, to the care and 
custody of the carrier or the operator of the amusement ride. 
Passengers give up, to strangers who are in the conveyance 
business, their freedom of movement and action and their ability to 
cause or prevent accidents. See, Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's Inc.. 396 
P.2d 933, 939 (Colo. 1964). This is true whether the operator of 
the conveyance is a traditional carrier or an amusement company. 
B & B's argument that people utilize carriers for necessary 
transportation, whereas riders of amusement devices do not ride of 
necessity, is not persuasive. As set forth in Ms. Lamb's initial 
Brief, there are innumerable instances of people's using 
traditionally recognized common carriers solely for purposes of 
entertainment and fun and not for purposes of "business or personal 
necessity." A vacationer, for example, who uses an airline to get 
to his or her vacation spot can expect and is unquestionably 
entitled to the same high standard of care as is a business person 
who is flying to the location of a critical meeting. 
*For what it's worth, and lest there be any misunderstanding, 
Ms. Lamb was certainly not "seeking thrills" in connection with her 
ride of the B & B coaster that came apart. She was taking care of 
the business of accompanying her three year old son on the ride. 
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The closer one looks at B & B's posited distinction between a 
traditional carrier and the operator of an amusement ride, the less 
sense it makes. For example, at the Lagoon amusement park, located 
in Davis County, Utah, there is a ride known as the "Sky Ride," 
which is essentially a horizontally-running, skilift-like 
conveyance extending from the north end to the south end of the 
park. Because that ride transports the patron from point A to 
point B, rather than returning the patron to the point where the 
ride begins, and because that ride is in fact used by some patrons 
for transportation from one end of Lagoon to the other, the entity 
that operates Lagoon could conceivably, with respect to that ride, 
under B & B's definition, be subjected to a common carrier's 
standard of care. Under B & B's posited distinction, that same 
entity would, with respect to the other rides in that same park 
(even though payment of one fee entitles the person to ride all 
rides, including the "Sky Ride"), be held only to an "ordinary" 
standard of care. What sense does that make? Similarly, under B 
& B's analysis, a Utah Transit Authority patron who, for whatever 
reason, "gets his kicks" by riding a bus around town for hours, and 
alights from the bus, according to plan, only when it returns to 
the stop at which he climbed aboard should be allowed to hold the 
UTA only to an "ordinary" standard of care, even though UTA clearly 
owes its more "normal," destination-seeking passengers the 
highest, common carrier, standard of care. 
In the modern world, there should be no distinction between 
the standard of care imposed upon traditional carriers and that 
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imposed upon the operators of amusement rides. As stated in Lewis 
v. Buckskin Joe's Inc., 396 P.2d at 939, it is not important 
whether a defendant is serving as a common carrier or is 
occupationally engaged in the provision of amusement rides. 
Whether the conveyance in question is a bus, a train, an airplane, 
or an amusement ride, the passengers of all surrender themselves, 
for a fee, to the inspection, maintenance, and operation expertise 
and care of entities who are engaged in business and who hold 
themselves out, expressly or by implication, as being worthy of the 
public trust. This Court should recognize that fact. 
B & B claims that Judge Rigtrup's failure to instruct the jury 
that the appropriate standard of care imposed upon B & B is that of 
a common carrier was, if error, not reversible error. However, 
based on the language of Jury Instruction Forms for Utah (JIFU) 
31.6, Ms. Lamb submits that failure to provide a common carrier 
instruction was reversible error. That form instruction, derived 
from Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co. , 147 P. 2d 875 (Utah 
1944), and Johnson v. Lewis, 240 P.2d 498 (Utah 1952), provides, in 
pertinent part: 
As a common carrier the defendant . . . was required by 
law to use the highest degree of care for the safe 
carriage of plaintiff, to provide everything reasonably 
necessary for that purpose and exercise a reasonable 
degree of skill. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The language of that instruction ("to provide everything 
reasonably necessary for that purpose") would be expected to have 
focused the jury's attention upon the component parts of a roller 
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coaster, including the bolt that either (1) broke or (2) fell out 
after its retaining nut or cotter pin came off. Ms. Lamb submits 
that that instruction is, especially when read against the dynamics 
of this case, substantially different from the instruction 
regarding ordinary care that was actually given. The jury would 
reasonably have been expected to have found B & B negligent if it 
had been instructed regarding this higher duty of care. For 
properly functioning and non-defective bolts were, beyond cavil, 
items that were "reasonably necessary for [the purpose] of the safe 
carriage" of Ms. Lamb. 
Finally, the fact that B & B obtained and used, in its 
argument to Judge Rigtrup regarding the standard-of-care issue, an 
affidavit of a state official indicating that Utah does not 
regulate the operators of amusement rides as common carriers is 
irrelevant. Such an affidavit has no bearing on the question of 
whether Judge Rigtrup could not or this Court cannot impose the 
standard of the highest degree of care upon the operators of 
amusement rides. 
POINT III 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO PERMIT B & B'S EXPERT TO TESTIFY THAT 
THE BOLT WAS "FLAWED." 
Ms. Lamb objected, at a side-bar conference (Tr. at 417) to 
the then-obviously-upcoming testimony of B & B's expert 
(Dr. Blotter) regarding his theory that the most likely cause of 
the roller coaster's failure was a defective or "flawed" bolt. 
That conference was conducted at a point in the proceedings where 
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its context and content is very clear. It is indisputable that 
Ms. Lamb's undersigned counsel did not object on the record (which 
he freely concedes he should have done but which he erroneously 
omitted to do at the time). Ms. Lamb contends, however, that it 
would be disingenuous for B & B's counsel (who was a party to that 
side-bar conference) to deny, with respect to such a potentially 
critical issue, that Ms. Lamb's counsel then and there in fact 
objected on grounds of surprise and non-response to Interroga-
tories, to the then-pending question and to the entire subject line 
of questioning, or that Judge Rigtrup then and there in fact 
overruled that objection to Dr. Blotter's testimony. This is 
something that should be addressed at oral argument. If B & B's 
counsel there acknowledges the accuracy of the foregoing recitation 
of what occurred during that conference, it would be an absurd 
promotion of form over substance for this Court to treat that 
objection and ruling as though they had not occurred. 
In any event (and as pointed out in paragraphs 16-18 of the 
Statement of Facts (pp. 15-17) appearing in Appellant's Brief), 
Ms. Lamb had, prior to trial, contended that B & B should not be 
allowed to seek to elicit the evidence it in fact successfully 
elicited from Dr. Blotter. She had already made whatever record 
she had to make, and Judge Rigtrup, in allowing Dr. Blotter to 
testify as he did, in essence denied Ms. Lamb's Motion in Limine. 
Furthermore, as also pointed out in that part of Appellant's Brief 
(top of p. 16), B & B in essence acknowledged, just prior to trial, 
that it would not seek to elicit the subject "flawed bolt" opinion 
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testimony of Dr. Blotter. 
It was not only error for Judge Rigtrup to allow Dr. Blotter 
to testify as he did. It was, as Ms. Lamb sought to explain in 
Appellant's Brief (at 38-41),2 and regardless of B & B's efforts to 
convince this Court otherwise, prejudicial, reversible error. But 
for Dr. Blotter's testimony, no reasonable jury would have found, 
as 6 of the 8 jurors did, that B & B was not negligent. And, 
contrary to B & B's contention, Ms. Lamb has, indeed, marshalled 
the evidence (Appellant's Brief at 38-41). 
B & B claims that it was not unfair surprise for Dr. Blotter 
to be allowed to testify as he did. However, this is not the case. 
B & B did not supplement its answers to Ms. Lamb's interrogatories 
which asked what it was to which B & B's expert(s) would testify at 
trial. Had Ms. Lamb known that Dr. Blotter would testify that in 
his opinion the most likely cause of the accident was a defective 
or "flawed" bolt, she would have been reasonably expected to have 
taken appropriate steps to prepare a more effective cross-
examination of Dr. Blotter and/or rebuttal testimony from a 
2Ms. Lamb's undersigned counsel has discovered, in the course 
of his preparation of this Reply Brief, an error that somehow 
occurred in the final preparation of those pages of Appellant's 
Brief. Although the context is nonetheless, it is hoped, clear, 
there is an important transitional clause that should appear 
between the last sentence on page 38 and the paragraph numbered 
"1." at the top of page 39. The transitional language that was 
inadvertently omitted was the following: 
Apart from Dr. Blotter's testimony, the only substantial 
evidence of B & B's supposed non-negligence was: 
Ms. Lamb's counsel expresses his regret for and apologizes for any 
inconvenience this omission and concomitant lack of clarity may 
have caused the Court or opposing counsel. 
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mechanical engineer of her choosing. 
It is inaccurate and misleading for B & B to contend that 
Ms. Lamb, in any meaningful sense, "opened the door" to 
Dr. Blotter's testimony, by reason of how her own expert, David 
Stephens, testified, or otherwise. The fact of the matter is that 
B & B knew, or should have known, by virtue of the testimony given 
in his deposition, that Mr. Stephens might, in passing, address and 
discuss at trial, as he did, the matter of whether the bolt may 
have been defective and whether such a defect could have caused the 
accident. A copy of that portion (p. 36, lines 14-24) of the 
transcript of the deposition of Mr. Stephens in which the matter is 
discussed is attached hereto as the Appendix. Particularly in 
light of this matter having been aired, however briefly, in the 
deposition of Mr. Stephens, it was incumbent on B & B not only to 
be forthright and thorough in its response to Ms. Lamb's 
interrogatories but also to be prepared to meet such an opinion if 
it should emerge, as it did, in Mr. Stephens's trial testimony. A 
review of the trial testimony of Dr. Blotter (Tr. at 380-471; see, 
especially, pp. 417-426) makes it quite clear that Dr. Blotter was 
thoroughly prepared to testify as he did regarding the supposed 
"flaw" in the bolt. Ms. Lamb submits that it is not reasonable to 
assume that he scampered to do his testing and analysis and come to 
his stated opinions within the less-than-48-hour period that 
separated the testimony of Mr. Stephens from his own. Try as it 
might, B & B cannot successfully argue either that it was surprised 
by the testimony of Mr. Stephens or that Dr. Blotter was not 
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prepared, before trial, to testify as he did. B & B's failure to 
inform Ms. Lamb, in timely fashion, of Dr. Blotters planned 
testimony violated both the letter and the spirit of the rules 
governing discovery and worked substantial harm to Ms. Lamb. 
Contrary to B & B's contention (B & B's Brief at 40), Dr. Blotters 
testimony was not in the nature of "rebuttal" testimony. B & B was 
a defendant, and it had a duty to prepare to meet Ms. Lamb's case 
in chief and to inform her of the expert testimony it would be 
offering in defense. 
Ms. Lamb acknowledges that Dr. Blotter could fairly have 
testified, based on the pre-trial proceedings, that, in his 
opinion, B & B acted appropriately if it, in fact, followed its own 
prescribed maintenance schedule. But to allow Dr. Blotter to 
testify that the most likely cause of the roller coaster was a 
"flawed" bolt, when Curtis was no longer a party to this suit and 
when Ms. Lamb had, despite her diligent use of the interrogatory 
procedure, no foreknowledge of what Dr. Blotter would say, was 
improper. It substantially and unfairly prejudiced Ms. Lamb. 
POINT IV 
B & B'S DISCUSSION OF THE SUPPOSEDLY 
"INCREDIBLE" NATURE OF MS. LAMB'S 
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS INAPPROPRIATE, 
IRRELEVANT, AND INACCURATE. 
B & B argues that an alleged lack of credibility on the part 
of Ms. Lamb and the "incredible" nature of her claims was an 
important factor in the jury's determination that B & B was not 
negligent. It is clearly inappropriate for B & B to ask the Court 
to join it in such a speculative endeavor. Indeed, B & B's effort 
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in making such an argument may be read as an indication of its own 
lack of belief in the strength of the other arguments advanced in 
its Brief. 
A Special Verdict form was submitted to the jury. Six of the 
eight jurors answered "no" to the question of whether B & B was 
negligent. Because the jury answered "no" to this question, none 
of the subsequent questions (regarding proximate cause and damages) 
was considered. This appeal relates to Ms. Lamb's contentions that 
the trial court committed reversible error, by granting Curtis's 
motion for summary judgment; by incorrectly instructing the jury 
regarding the standard of care governing B & B's conduct; and by 
permitting B & B's expert to testify as he did regarding the bolt. 
It does not deal with Ms. Lamb's claims for damages. In the event 
that the Court is interested, for any reason, in reviewing such 
evidence as is contained in the record on appeal regarding Ms. 
Lamb's credibility and damages, such evidence is contained not only 
in the one-sided recitation of portions of the transcript cited by 
B & B. It is also contained in the entirety of Ms. Lamb's 
testimony (Tr. at 243-293; 328-380) and in Trial Exhibits 9, 10, 
17, 19, 20, and 21 (consisting of medical and related reports 
(Exhibits 9, 17, 20, and 21) and summaries (Exhibits 10 and 19) of 
her special damages). Several of Ms. Lamb's health care providers 
were called by her, at trial, and testified concerning the nature, 
causation, severity, and permanency of her injuries. She did not 
request transcripts of the testimony of those witnesses because she 
did not think her damages would be a focus of this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing as well as on the discussion and 
analysis appearing in Appellant's Brief, Ms. Lamb urges the Court 
to correct the errors made at the trial court level, to permit her 
to have her true day in court against both defendants, 
simultaneously, and to let the jury, in that trial, sort out the 
issues of strict liability, negligence (on a common-carrier 
standard with respect to B & B) , causation, and damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /? day of March 1992. 
WINDER A HASLAM, P.C. 
By. 
Peter C. Collins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the /7 day of March 1992, I caused four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF to 
be mailed with postage pre-paid to each of the following: 
Robert H. Henderson, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
1352\Bricf 
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APPENDIX 
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DEPOSITION OF: 
DAVID CLARK STEPHENS 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 15TH DAY OF MARCH, 19'90, 
THE DEPOSITION OF DAVID CLARK STEPHENS, PRODUCED AS A WITNESS 
HEREIN AT THE INSTANCE OF THE DEFENDANT B S B AMUSEMENTS CORP., 
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SHORTHAND REPORTER AND NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF 
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THE OFFICES OF HANSON, EPPERSON S SMITH, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 
#*f TRIAD CENTER, SUITE 500, SALT LAKE CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
THAT SAID DEPOSITION WAS TAKEN PURSUANT TO NOTICE. 
Repertlrf Service, Ire. 
322 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-0256 
Susan K. Hellberg, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
1 ONLY TWO OPTIONS THAT YOU CAN ENVISION THAT WOULD HAVE CAUSED 
2 THIS BOLT TO BREAK? 
3 A THE THIRD OPTION IS THAT THE BOLT DID NOT BREAK, 
4 AND THE NUT FELL OFF AND THE BOLT FELL OUT OF ITS OWN WEIGHT, 
5 AND WHATEVER THEY MAY HAVE FOUND WAS NOT RELATED TO THE 
6 ACCIDENT. 
7 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PORTION 
8 OF THE BOLT THAT WAS FOUND BY THE EMPLOYEES OF B & B 
9 AMUSEMENT UNDER THE CHILDREN'S ROLLER COASTER AT THE TIME OF 
10 THIS ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE BOLT THAT HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS 
11 COUPLING? 
12 I A I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT. I MERELY GAVE 
13 YOU AN OPTION. 
14 Q ISN'T ANOTHER OPTION THE FACT THAT THERE MAY HAVE 
15 BEEN SOME DEFECT IN THE BOLT? 
16 A I GUESS THAT'S AN OPTION, YES. 
17 Q SO THERE MAY BE OTHER OPTIONS, IT'S JUST THOSE ARE 
18 THE ONLY ONES THAT YOU COULD COME UP WITH? 
19 A I FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT A 
20 DEFECTIVE BOLT, EVEN DEFECTIVE, WOULD CAUSE THIS ACCIDENT. 
21 Q WHY IS THAT? 
22 A BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OF STRESS APPLIED IN THIS 
23 CIRCUMSTANCE COMPARED TO THE TENSILE STRENGTH OF ANY GRADE 
24 BOLT IS VERY LOW. 
25 I Q HAVE YOU DONE ANY CALCULATIONS TO DETERMINE WHAT 
